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Hans Kelsen and the Tradition of Natural Law: Why Kelsen’s Objections 
to the Natural-law Doctrine Does Not Apply Against Aquinas’s Theory of 
Natural Law 
 
Abstract: In his works, Hans Kelsen elaborates several objections to the so-called “doctrine of natural 
law”, especially in his essay The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of Science. Kelsen argues 
that natural law theorists, searching for an absolute criterion for justice, try to deduce from nature the 
rules of human behavior. Robert P. George, in the essay Kelsen and Aquinas on the ‘Natural Law 
Doctrine’ examines his criticism and concludes that what Kelsen understands as the Natural-law 
doctrine does not include the natural law theory elaborated by Thomas Aquinas. In this paper, we will 
try to corroborate George’s theses and try to show how Aquinas’ natural law theory can be vindicated 
against Kelsens criticisms. 
Keywords: Natural Law, Hans Kelsen, Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle. 
 
1. Introduction 
The so-called "natural-law doctrine" is a constant target of criticism by Hans Kelsen. In his 
essay The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of Science, published originally in 1949, 
Kelsen elaborates one of the most forceful  criticism to it. Kelsen argues that natural law 
theorists, searching for an absolute criterion for justice, try to deduce from nature the rules of 
human behavior. In his  opinion, that demand is not an acceptable project to the court of 
science.
1 
The  Natural-Law  doctrine  before  the  Tribunal  of  Science  concentrates  the  core  of 
Kelsen’s objections to the natural-law doctrine. However, in that text, Kelsen does not make 
any reference to Thomas Aquinas. In fact, references to Aquinas appear in other texts on the 
natural  law  and  the  question  of  justice,  but  they  are  always,  in  the  context  of  Kelsen’s 
thought, isolated and superficial references. 
Robert  P.  George,  in  the  essay  Kelsen  and  Aquinas  on  the  ‘Natural  Law  Doctrine’, 
examines The Natural-Law doctrine before the Tribunal of Science and concludes that what 
Kelsen  understands  as  the  Natural-law  doctrine  does  not  include  the  natural  law  theory 
                                                           
1 Hans Kelsen, The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of Science, originally published in: The Western 
Political Quarterly, December, 1949. Reprinted in: What is Justice? Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of 
Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (brazilian edition: O problema da Justiça, 1988) 2 
elaborated by Thomas Aquinas. So, according to Robert P. George, Kelsen’s criticism cannot 
be applied to the natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas.
2 
In this paper, we will try to corroborate Robert P. George’s theses. We will try to show 
how Aquinas’ natural law theory can be vindicated against Kelsens criticisms. 
 
II. Kelsen’s Criticism and the Response of the Thomistic Theory of Natural Law 
One  of  Kelsen’s  critiques  of  natural  law  ethics  and  jurisprudence  refers  to  its  supposed 
idealist and immutable character. Kelsen argues that the doctrine of natural law is an "idealist 
legal doctrine." In Kelsen’s account of the natural law, the jusnaturalism asserts the existence 
of an ideal, unchangeable right identified to the justice and recognizes in nature the source 
from which emanates its precepts.
3 
This  characterization is suitable to  the modern conceptions  of natural  law. However, 
according  to  Aquinas,  natural  law  does  not  involve  anything  ideal.  Rather,  its  definition, 
which has its roots in Aristotelian thought, implies the observation and the study of reality. 
Unlike modern natural-law doctrines, for Aristotle and Aquinas, natural precepts are not 
deducted  from  a  priori  principles.  Neither  Aristotle  nor  Aquinas  was  carried  away  by 
abstractions. Natural law, in the Aristotelian perspective, and also in the Thomist account, is 
described based on concrete concepts, concepts derived from the observation of reality, like, 
for example, the description of human nature. If the characteristics of abstraction and idealism 
can be attributed to some jusnaturalistic theory, they can, and should, be attributed exclusively 
to the modern description of natural law, not to the classic one. In its various versions, the 
modern theory of law emptied the contents of the concepts presents in the definition of natural 
law, making them ambiguous, and departing, definitely, from the anthropological perspective 
of classical ethics. 
The definition of law in the Thomistic and Aristotelian perspective reveals that concrete 
character present in the classical jurisprudence. In this perspective, law (ius), in its primary 
sense, has no connection with power  and is directly attached to the virtue of justice.  Ius 
means,  primarily,  the  just  thing,  the  suum  in  the  Roman  formula  of  justice  suum  cuique 
tribuere (giving to each one his own). It is therefore an object of the virtue of justice, namely, 
the thing on which falls the just action. Law (lex), in turn, is only one dimension of legal 
practice  and  consists  in  determined  rule  or  measure  of  law  (ius).  It  is  a  fundamental 
dimension, of course, but does not exhaust, in itself, the whole universe of the legal practice. 
                                                           
2 Robert P. George, Kelsen and Aquinas on the ‘Natural Law Doctrine’, in: St. Thomas Aquinas & the natural 
law tradition: contemporary perspectives, 2004. 
3 Hans Kelsen, O problema da Justiça, 1988, 71. 3 
The practice of law in classical philosophy refers to concrete things and law (ius) is 
understood as a reality. In this context, ius naturale and lex naturale are also found on the 
nature of things. 
Ius naturale, according to Aquinas, consists in an ordered set of principles determined by 
reason, related to human behavior. In the Treatise on Law (Summa Theologica), Aquinas 
introduces the concept of lex naturale. Lex in general is a certain dictate of reason (rationis 
ordinatio)  for  the  common  good,  made  by  him  who  has  the  care  of  the  community  and 
promulgated. Lex naturale, in this sense, is the participation of eternal law in the rational 
creature. Eternal law (lex aeterna), in turn, is a set of archetypes, analogous to the world of 
Ideas, which are found as the divine ideas in the mind of God.
4 
The precepts of ius naturale are, therefore, "the first principles of human works"
5 and the 
primary and fundamental precept is: "good is to be done and sought and evil avoided".
6 The 
good is thus the end sought by human action, through practical reason. Thus, what makes us 
distinguish between good and evil is nothing more than the impression of divine light in 
humans, namely, the natural law ( lex  naturale).  The  primary  principle  is  known  by  all 
humans. The others natural precepts, however, modify according to specific circumstances in 
which the man is placed. 
According to  Hans  Kelsen, in  turn, the natural law theories support the existence of 
immutable  natural  precepts.  This  characteristic  can  in  no  way  be  attributed  to  Aquinas’ 
description of natural law. There is, indeed, an unalterable core formed by the primary and 
general precept of natural law, which derives the other principles. Man possesses the innate 
ability  to  know  practical  judgments  and,  for  that  reason,  captures,  unerringly,  this 
fundamental and unchangeable principle. However, from this first precept, the man judges, 
through practical reason and, therefore, a posteriori, in the concrete conditions in which he 
acts, something as good or as bad, as they are directed, or not, to the human being purposes. 
Thus, the secondary precepts can change because they depend on particular contexts. 
In his critique of natural law, Hans Kelsen, in his essay The Natural-Law doctrine before 
the Tribunal of Science and in his work The Problem of Justice (brazilian edition of 1998: O 
problema  da  Justiça),  supports  also  that  the  natural  law  doctrine  attribute  to  nature  the 
function of legislative authority, as if the natural precepts were "norms which we are already 
                                                           
4 Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 90 ff. 
5 Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 1. 
6 Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2. 4 
given to us in nature before to its possible determination by acts of human will, norms that 
are, in essence, unchangeable and immutable." 
7 
For Aquinas, natural precepts are not derived from any kind of authority  -  whether 
human or suprahuman. Lex naturale connects to human nature and its force derives from 
practical  reason.  Thus,  the  classical  theory  of  natural  law  is  not  based  on  any  kind  of 
voluntarism and it is not necessary, therefore, appeal to any entity with authority to get to 
know natural principles. According to Robert P. George  "[natural law] is intrinsic to human 
beings; its fundamental referents are the human goods that constitute human well-being and 
fulfillment and precisely as such are reasons for action”.
8 
 
III. Conclusion 
Therefore, examining the Hans Kelsen’s objections is not difficult to see that they do not 
apply to Aquinas’s natural law theory, because what Kelsen understands as "the natural-law 
doctrine” does not include the Thomist description of law and legal practice. The real object 
of Kelsen’s criticism is the modern account of natural law. In its proper sense (it means: while 
directed against modern conceptions of natural law), Kelsen’s criticisms are well developed 
and effective. Notwithstanding, Kelsen's criticism cannot reach the classical elaborations of 
natural law. More specifically, those criticisms do not reach Thomas Aquinas’s theoretical 
elaboration of natural law. 
  Hans Kelsen is an example of legal theorist capable to gather and take to the extreme, 
with consistency and depth, the typical features of modernity. His criticism of natural law is 
developed from modern theoretical elaborations that have failed in the attempt to fill the gap 
caused by the rupture with classical thought. Thus, their objections only reach theses inserted 
within the same theoretical context, namely, the modern jusnaturalism. Moreover, the analysis 
of the objections to the jusnaturalistic theories highlights the demand to recover classical 
jurisprudence  and  ethics  so  that  we  can  face,  with  depth  and  consistency,  fundamental 
questions  concerning  justice  and  law.  Issues  that  were  not  proper  addressed  neither  by 
jusracionalists nor for juspositivists. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
7 See Kelsen (note 1).  
8 See George (note 2), 241. 5 
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